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Incentives for Information Production in Markets
where Prices Aﬀect Real Investment
Abstract
We analyze information production incentives for traders in financial mar-
kets, when firms condition investment decisions on information revealed through
stock prices. We show that traders’ private value of information about a firm’s
investment project increases with the ex ante likelihood the project will be un-
dertaken. This generates an informational amplification eﬀect of shocks to firm
value. Information production by traders may exhibit strategic complementar-
ities for projects that would not be undertaken in the absence of positive news
from the stock market. A small decline in fundamentals can lead to a market
breakdown where information production ceases, and investment and firm value
collapse. Our theory sheds light on how productivity shocks are amplified over
the business cycle. (JEL: G14, G31, E32)
1 Introduction
Financial markets play a vital role in the economy. Even when no capital is-
suance is directly involved — i.e., in secondary financial markets — market prices
indirectly guide investment decisions in the real economy. A literature in finan-
cial economics provides empirical evidence on the real eﬀects of prices in financial
markets and studies the theoretical implications of models in which financial mar-
kets not only reflect the cash flows generated by traded assets but also aﬀect those
cash flows. This is known as the “feedback eﬀect.”1
Hayek (1945) argued that prices are key sources of information for guiding
production and allocation decisions. Prices aggregate information from many
diﬀerent traders, providing information that would be hard to generate otherwise.
Hayek was referring to prices of all goods and services in the economy, but the
argument applies to stock prices also. Stock prices contain information that can
guide the decisions of managers, capital providers, and other decision makers
in the real economy. It is therefore important to understand the forces behind
information production by traders in financial markets and how this information
gets into market prices.
In this paper, we analyze a model of the incentives for financial-market traders
to produce information when they take into account the informational feedback
from the prices of traded securities to firms’ investment decisions. The analysis
generates a new insight on the interaction between financial markets and the real
economy: we show that the feedback eﬀect and the endogeneity of information
production, make financial markets amplify small shocks in fundamentals into
1See a recent review article by Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein (2012).
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large changes in real investments and firm values. The amplification may be
very large. A small decrease in fundamentals can lead to a discontinuous drop in
information production, investment, and firm values.
In the model, a firm has to decide between taking a new investment opportu-
nity (growth option) or continuing with the current strategy (business as usual).
In making the decision, the firm relies to some extent on information reflected in
its stock price. This information gets into the stock price via the trading of spec-
ulators, who acquire information about the profitability of the growth option.
These speculators can be thought of as institutional traders or individuals, who
can investigate the prospects of the opportunity the firm faces and make profits
by trading on the information they gather. The informativeness of the security
price for the firm’s decision depends on how many speculators choose to become
informed. This is determined endogenously in equilibrium by a break-even con-
dition, such that the marginal speculator’s benefit from acquiring information
does not exceed his cost of doing so.
The amplification result in this framework is based on two eﬀects. First,
speculators have stronger incentives to produce information about firms’ growth
opportunities when these opportunities are ex-ante more profitable. When ex-
ante profitability decreases, the firm is less likely to pursue the growth opportu-
nity. Then, the value of the security becomes less sensitive to the information
about the growth opportunity, and so this information does not enable specula-
tors to make high profits from trading the security. Hence, they are discouraged
from producing the information. Second, the information produced in the finan-
cial market has a positive eﬀect on firm value because it leads to more eﬃcient
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investment decisions. When speculators are discouraged from producing infor-
mation, the firm becomes less valuable. Together these two eﬀects imply that
a decrease in the profitability of growth opportunities leads to less information
production, amplifying the decrease in firm value beyond the direct eﬀect of the
decrease in profitability.
As ex-ante fundamentals deteriorate further, the amplification mechanism is
strengthened by the emergence of strategic complementarities among speculators.
Strategic complementarities in our model result from the feedback eﬀect. When
ex-ante fundamentals are weak, the firm will only consider making the invest-
ment if the amount of information coming from the market is suﬃciently large
(and positive). Hence, in this region of the fundamentals, speculators’ profits
increase when more other speculators produce information, as this increases the
chance that the firm will make the investment. Indeed, as ex-ante fundamentals
get weaker and strategic complementarities emerge, a small deterioration in fun-
damentals can lead to a discontinuous collapse in information production, with
associated large drops in investment activity and firm valuations.
We link our model to the literature on business-cycle fluctuations. We show
that changes in the profitability of new investment opportunities can be ampli-
fied in our model leading to large changes in total factor productivity (TFP)
and factor inputs (either labor or capital). These are two channels that have
been identified by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007) as potential channels for
large fluctuations over the business cycle. The drop in the profitability of new
investment opportunities leads to a decrease in information production, which
reduces productivity further and may cause firms to invest less. While there are
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many papers describing mechanisms for amplification over the business cycle, our
mechanism is unique in that it involves changes in stock-market informativeness,
which should be an important channel given the central role of the stock market
in the real economy.
We also provide a welfare analysis. We show that the amount of information
produced by speculators in equilibrium is very diﬀerent from the amount that
a social planner would choose. Speculators have stronger incentives to produce
more information on investments which are more likely to be undertaken, whereas
from a welfare perspective information is more valuable when the investment is
close to a zero net present value, because in that case information can help
make the right decision. This is reminiscent of Hirshleifer’s (1971) discussion of
diﬀerent types of information and how markets may incentivize the production
of information which is socially useless. We discuss policy implications of the
model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe
the basic model of feedback. Section 3 derives the equilibrium outcomes. In
Section 4, we analyze the eﬀect of expected project profitability on information
production, and demonstrate the amplification result and the relation to business-
cycle fluctuations. Section 5 discusses welfare implications, relation to existing
literature, empirical implications. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated
to the appendix. Further results on welfare and belief dispersion are available in
an online appendix.
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2 A Model of Feedback
There is a firm that can take a decision  ∈ {0 1}  The decision about  can
be thought of in very general terms, representing anything that aﬀects the firm’s
value, e.g., CEO replacement decisions, organizational change etc. Throughout
the paper we will interpret  as representing an investment opportunity and refer
to  as a project choice.
The firm’s value depends on the choice of  and the realization of a state of
the world  ∈ { }, where each state is ex-ante equally likely. If the firm takes
project  = 0, its value is 0 for sure. If the firm takes action  = 1 its value  is
state dependent and, without loss of generality, we assume   . We therefore
refer to project  = 0 as the low risk project and  = 1 as the risky project.2 To
introduce some value of learning about the state of the world, we assume that
the value maximizing project depends on . In particular   0  , so that
 = 1 is optimal in state  =  and  = 0 is optimal in state  =  Define by
 the ex-ante expected value from taking the risky project  = 1:
 ≡  + 
2

The firm’s shares give a proportional entitlement to the final payoﬀ, which is
 if the firm chooses the risky project and 0 if it does not. Importantly, no other
securities have payoﬀs that are contingent on . Markets are thus incomplete and
spanning is endogenous to the firm’s decision. An example of such a situation
would be the gains from synergies in a hypothetical merger, where the actual
2Note that the results do not change significantly if one allows the low risk project to entail
some risk.
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gains will not be observed unless the merger takes place. Similarly, a firm might
invest in a growth opportunity, but if the firm chooses not to do so, nobody
could ever find out whether this investment would have been valuable, had the
firm invested in it.
The shares are traded in a market similar to the one in Kyle (1985). We use
functional forms that are standard in the microstructure literature and convenient
for our analysis. There are three types of traders: liquidity traders, speculators,
and a market maker. There is a mass of measure 1 of speculators who are
risk neutral and indexed by  ∈ [0 1]. Each speculator can learn a noisy signal
 ∈ { } about  at cost   0. Denote by   12 the probability with which a
signal is correct, i.e.,
 =  ( = | = )
=  ( = | = ) 
Assume that, conditional on the realization of the state of the world,  is dis-
tributed independently across speculators.
After observing their own signal, each speculator can trade an amount ,
where  ∈ [−1 1]. That is, there are frictions (such as limited wealth) that
constrain trade size to a maximum of 1. Denote by  the (endogenous) mea-
sure of speculators that become informed about . Liquidity traders submit a
total order  which is normally distributed with 0 mean and variance 2. The
presence of liquidity traders ensures that equilibrium prices only partially reveal
the speculators’ information. This allows speculators to make trading profits in
equilibrium, without which they would not be willing to incur the cost of infor-
mation production (see Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). Liquidity traders are pure
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noise traders. We will get back to this point in the online appendix where we
analyze welfare. Total order flow  is:3
 = +
Z 
0
 (1)
The total order flow is submitted to a risk neutral market maker who observes
, but not its components. He then sets the price equal to the expected value
of the firm conditional on the order flow.4
An important ingredient in our model is the feedback from the price to the
firm’s investment. The firm’s manager does not observe the state of the world .
He observes the share price and uses this information to update his belief about
 and consequently about the optimal project. He then makes a decision about
the project to maximize expected firm value given the information available to
him from the price. Of course, this feedback eﬀect is taken into account by the
market maker when setting the price. For simplicity, we do not allow the firm
to produce information in-house. However, our results do not require there to
be no in-house information production. The important element is that there are
some types of information that the market has an advantage in producing.
3Uninformed speculators in our model optimally choose not to trade, because they would
incur a loss in expectation from trading.
4As in Kyle (1985), this can be justified as a result of a perfectly-competitive market-making
industry.
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3 Characterization of Equilibrium
3.1 Trading decisions and project choice
From risk neutrality and because each speculator is too small to have a price
impact, we know that if speculators acquire information, they will trade the
maximum size possible.5 As will become clear later on, it is optimal for informed
speculators to buy one unit upon observing the signal  =  and to sell one unit
following the signal  = . As a result, by the law of large numbers, when the
state is  =  a measure  of speculators will buy, and a measure  (1− ) will
sell. Aggregate order flow is therefore  = + (2− 1). Conversely, when the
state is  = , aggregate order flow will be  = −  (2− 1).
Observing the order flow, the market maker updates his beliefs. We define
(;) ≡ Pr( = |) as his updated probability that the state is , given the
observed order flow  and a belief about the measure of informed speculators .
By Bayes’ rule,
(;) =  ( −  (2− 1)) ( −  (2− 1)) +  ( +  (2− 1))  (2)
where () is the density function of the normal distribution with mean 0 and
variance 2. The risky project is worth taking if and only if the updated proba-
bility (;) is suﬃciently high, such that the updated NPV of the risky project
is higher than that of the safe project:
(;) +  (1− (;))  0
Since the normal distribution satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property,
5Except when they expect the price to exactly equal the value, an outcome which does not
arise in our model.
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we know that (;) is strictly increasing in  as long as   0. Thus, there is
a cut-oﬀ value () such that the risky project is optimal, given the information
in the order flow, if and only if    (). The threshold  () is defined by
( () ;) +  ¡1− ( () ;)¢ = 0 (3)
Using (2), (3) and the normal density function, we can derive
 () = 
2
2 (2− 1) ln
1− 
  (4)
where
 ≡ 1
2
+
 − 0
 −   (5)
The parameter  will turn out to be a convenient variable for comparative statics.
If the range of firm values under the risky project,  − , is constant,  is a
direct measure of the ex-ante profitability of the risky relative to the riskless
project. When the risky project is ex-ante more valuable (  0), we have
  12 , while we have   12 for the opposite case (  0).
Note that the threshold  () depends on the firm’s (and market maker’s)
belief about the amount of trade due to the informed speculators. When   12 
 () is positive and decreasing in  To see this, note that in the limit, if
there is no informed trade ( = 0), the firm would not invest in the risky project
regardless of the order flow, and so  () goes to ∞. As  becomes positive and
increases, there is more information in the order flow, and so the firm would be
willing to invest at some positive order flows (when    ()), and the cutoﬀ
above which it invests decreases as  increases and there is more information in
the market. Conversely, if   12 , the threshold  () is negative and increasing
in .
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In a first step, we will solve for the equilibrium in the continuation game after
all speculators have chosen whether or not to acquire information and trade on
it as described before. An equilibrium of the continuation game then consists of
the following: (a) A ‘fair’ price set by the market maker conditional on observed
order flow, given a belief about  and the firm’s investment policy, (b) an action
 by the firm that maximizes its expected value conditional on the observed
stock price, and beliefs about  and the pricing rule. Moreover, the beliefs must
be correct in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 For a given , the continuation game has an equilibrium where the
market maker uses the pricing rule:
 () =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
() +  (1− ()) if    ()
0 if  ≤  ()
 (6)
and the firm takes the risky project if and only if
 ()  0 (7)
An important feature of the equilibrium given by (6) and (7) is that the risky
project is taken if and only if it ought to be undertaken based on the information
revealed to the market maker by the order flow. The market maker observes the
order flow and sets a price that guides the firm to make the right decision in
expectation. There are also equilibria without this feature. For example, when
  12 , there is an equilibrium where the market maker sets  () = 0 for any
 and the firm optimally always chooses the risk free project. In this case, it is
ex-ante optimal to take the risk free project, and so, given that the price reveals
no new information, this is what the firm does. Similarly, even when   12 there
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could be equilibria, where there is some  0   () and a pricing rule where the
price is 0 below  0 . This can be an equilibrium if observing a price of 0 (given
this pricing rule) provides suﬃciently strong information that the true state is
 = , such that the firm optimally chooses the riskless project. The equilibrium
described in Lemma 1 is the only equilibrium that survives the slight modification
of the model in which the firm can observe order flow directly. Given that prices
are set under the implicit assumption that there are many competing market
makers it would be plausible to assume that order flow is public information and
thus also observed by the firm. We will therefore focus on the equilibrium in
Lemma 1 for the continuation game.
3.2 Trading profits
We now analyze the equilibrium amount of information production. For this, we
need to calculate the expected trading profits of an informed speculator, as a
function of how many other speculators become informed. Denote by  () the
expected profits in a candidate equilibrium in which a measure  of speculators
become informed. Using  () from (4), we get:
Lemma 2 A speculator’s optimal trading strategy is to buy on  =  and to sell
on  = . The expected trading profit is then given by
 () = (2− 1) ( − )
Z ∞
()
(;) (8)
where
(;) ≡  (−  (2− 1)) (+  (2− 1)) (−  (2− 1)) +  (+  (2− 1))  (9)
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3.3 Information acquisition in equilibrium
Speculators decide whether to acquire information by comparing the cost  to
the profit  (). Using b to denote the equilibrium level of , an equilibrium
with interim level of information production (b ∈ (0 1)) is obtained when, given
that a measure b of speculators choose to produce information, a speculator who
acquires information breaks even in expectation:
(b) =  (10)
We focus on equilibria that are stable to small perturbations around b. A stable
equilibrium requires that the profit function  () is decreasing in  at the point
solving (10).
Alternatively, there may be a corner solution for b. An equilibrium with
no information production (b = 0) is obtained when, given that none of the
speculators produce information, the cost of producing information is greater
than the expected trading profit:
(0)   (11)
The opposite corner solution can occur if all speculators wish to acquire and
trade on information, which happens when
(1) ≥  (12)
We now solve for the equilibrium in information acquisition decisions, taking
as given the equilibrium of the continuation game from Lemma 1. The charac-
terization of equilibrium outcomes is diﬀerent depending on whether the risky or
the riskless project is ex-ante optimal. We first analyze the case where the risky
project is ex-ante optimal.
12
3.4 Equilibrium outcomes
3.4.1 Equilibrium when the risky project is ex-ante optimal
When   0 (i.e.,   12), the firm will choose the risky project in the absence
of information about the underlying state . Proposition 1 characterizes the
equilibrium outcomes for this case.
Proposition 1 When the risky project  = 1 is ex-ante optimal (  0), there
exists a unique equilibrium.
(i) If  ≥ (2− 1) −2 , no information is produced (b = 0) and the firm
always chooses  = 1.
(ii) If   (2− 1) −2 , and  (1)   then we have an interior solution
b ∈ (0 1), while for  (1) ≥  we have a corner solution b = 1.
According to Proposition 1, no information is produced if the cost of informa-
tion production is too high, whereas a positive measure of speculators choose to
become informed if information is not too costly. This measure is pinned down
uniquely by the cost of information production and the other parameters of the
model.
3.4.2 Equilibrium when the riskless project is ex-ante optimal
Consider now the case  ≤ 0 (i.e., ≤ 12) so that the firm chooses the risk-
less project in the absence of further information about the state of the world.
Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibrium outcomes for this case. Define by
max ≡ max∈[01]  () and max ≡ argmax∈[01]  ()
Proposition 2 When the riskless project is ex-ante optimal ( ≤ 0):
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(i) There always exists an equilibrium with no information production (b =
0).
(ii) If   max, then b = 0 is the unique equilibrium and the firm always
chooses the riskless project  = 0.
(iii) If  ≤ max, there exist multiple equilibria. There is always an equilibrium
with b = 0 and the firm chooses the riskless project. All other equilibria have
b  0 and the firm chooses the risky project with positive probability. Specifically,
(a) if max ∈ (0 1)  then there exist at least the following equilibria: b1 = 0,
b2 ∈ (0 max] and b3 ∈ [max 1) if  (1)   or b3 = 1 if  (1) ≥  (b) If
max = 1, then there exist at least the following equilibria: b1 = 0, b2 ∈ (0 1)
and b3 = 1. (c) Overall, there exists an open set of parameters for which there
exists b3  1.
Unlike the case when the risky project is ex-ante optimal, there may now
be multiple equilibria. There is always an equilibrium with no production of
information. If the cost of information production is high (  max), this is
the only equilibrium. Otherwise, there are additional equilibria with positive
measures of informed speculators.
3.4.3 Discussion of equilibrium outcomes
Figure 1 depicts the expected trading profits as a function of the measure of
speculators who choose to acquire information. The hump shaped curve is for
the case where the riskless project is ex-ante optimal (here,  = 049), while the
downward sloping curve is for the opposite case (here,  = 051). When the risky
project is ex-ante optimal, trading profits are monotonically decreasing in  and
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hence there is a unique equilibrium. When the riskless project is ex-ante optimal,
the profit function is hump-shaped, and hence there may be multiple equilibria.
If the cost of information production is high enough (00 in the figure), then the
only equilibrium exhibits no information production. If the cost of information is
lower (0 in the figure), then there are at least three equilibria. The case depicted
in the figure generates three equilibria: b1, b2 and b3. Note that the equilibrium
b2 ∈ (0 max) is on the increasing segment of the profit function and therefore
unstable. The other two equilibria b1 and b3 are both stable and will be the
focus of the subsequent discussion.
To understand the way equilibria depend on whether or not the risky project
is ex-ante optimal, it is useful to isolate the underlying economic eﬀects that a
change in the number of informed traders has on each trader’s profits. First, there
is the standard eﬀect in models of informed trading with exogenous investment
(e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)). As more speculators become informed, the
equilibrium price is closer to the value of the stock, and profits are reduced. This
causes a downward slope in the profit function. We call this the competitive eﬀect.
It generates strategic substitutability in agents’ decisions to produce information.
Going back to the expression for profits in (8), this eﬀect is captured by the fact
that (;) is decreasing in  (see Proof of Proposition 1).
Second, there is the eﬀect caused by the endogeneity of the firm’s investment
decision, captured by the eﬀect of  on (). The direction of this eﬀect depends
on whether or not the risky project is ex-ante optimal. If the risky project is ex-
ante optimal, the firm’s ‘default’ action is  = 1. Additional information then
leads the firm not to take risk some of the time, so that the overall likelihood
15
Figure 1: The figure shows trading profits as a function of the mass of informed
traders  The top line is for the case when the risky project is ex ante optimal.
Parameter values are  = 204  = 004 0 = 102 (hence,  = 051). The
bottom line is for the opposite case with parameter values  = 2  = 0 0 =
102 (hence,  = 049). Other parameter values are 2 = 05 and  = 09. The
figure also shows two diﬀerent costs of information production 0 and 00 and
equilibrium values b1 b2 and b3 for 0 and  = 049.
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of risk taking falls when more information becomes available ( () increases in
). This reinforces the competitive eﬀect because as more speculators produce
information, the riskless project is taken more often and thus the value of the
stock becomes less sensitive to the information produced, reducing speculators’
incentives to produce information even further. Trading profits therefore decrease
in  and the equilibrium is unique.
If the riskless project is ex-ante optimal, the firm’s default choice is not to take
risk. As speculators produce information, the firm may sometimes learn positive
news and choose to take the risky project, namely when    ()  Moreover,
the threshold  () decreases in  so that an increase in the number of informed
speculators increases the likelihood that the firm takes the risky project. This
renders firm value more sensitive to an individual speculator’s private informa-
tion. There is an informational leverage eﬀect,6 where information becomes more
valuable as more agents produce it. Information production exhibits strategic
complementarity. The interaction between the competitive eﬀect and the infor-
mational leverage eﬀect causes the profit function to be non-monotone.7
As a result of the non-monotonicity, we have multiple equilibria. First, there
always exists the equilibrium b1 = 0 in which no information is produced.8
This happens for the following reason. When nobody produces information, the
firm never chooses the risky action. Then, the value of the firm’s securities is
6We thank Rohit Rahi for suggesting this terminology.
7Boot and Thakor’s (1997) model exhibits a similar non-monotonicity, although they do not
explore this feature.
8Dow and Gorton (1997) also has multiple equilibria when the risky project is negative NPV.
Because in that paper information is free, it corresponds to the two points on Figure 1 at zero
information cost.
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completely insensitive to the information that the speculator collected. He can
therefore make no profit from trading and it is thus not worthwhile paying the
cost to become informed.9 Second, when the cost of information production is
not too high (  max), there is a stable equilibrium b3 ∈ (max 1] with a
strictly positive amount of information production. Figure 1 depicts the case
where the equilibrium is given by an interior solution b3 ∈ (max 1). This is
the more interesting case, because it allows us to conduct comparative statics on
the equilibrium amount of information production - unlike the corner solution
b3 = 1. In this equilibrium there is information production and trade, so that the
firm chooses the risky action with suﬃcient likelihood to generate enough infor-
mation sensitivity of the firm’s securities. Although more informed trade would
increase the information sensitivity of the firm’s security further, this cannot be
an equilibrium, because prices would become so revealing as to reduce trading
profits below .
Note also, that the equilibrium is discontinuous with respect to changes in
fundamentals, e.g., the cost  of information production. Consider a cost  such
that  (1)    max and therefore b3  1. As  increases from its initial
level, b3 will fall continuously until  = max and b3 = max. At that point a
small increase in  will lead to a discontinuous drop in the equilibrium amount of
information production all the way to b1 = 0, which becomes the only possible
equilibrium. We will explore this point in more detail in the next section.
9Note that this result does not depend on the ‘low information’ equilibrium coinciding with
exactly zero information. One could allow a small fraction 0 of speculators to be informed
for free. For 0 small, we would have  (0)   and therefore no additional speculator would
choose to become informed.
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We now turn to a comparative static analysis of equilibrium information
production with respect to the parameter . For this purpose, in case of multiple
equilibria, we will focus on the most informative equilibrium. The notation b will
refer to this equilibrium only, i.e., b ≡ max {b1 b2 b3}. We discuss the welfare
ranking of multiple equilibria in an online appendix.
4 Information Production and Amplification
4.1 Profitability and information production
We analyze the eﬀect of expected profitability of the risky project, measured by
 (as defined in (5)) on the equilibrium amount of information production b.
In varying , we wish to consider only the eﬀect of the relative profitability of
the risky action without changing anything else in the factors that determine b.
Inspecting the profit function in (8) and the expression for  () in (4), which
is key in determining the profit, we can see that this amounts either to changing
0 or to changing  , keeping  −  constant.
Proposition 3 establishes the eﬀect of  on b. Trivially, when the equilibrium
is at either corner (b = 0 if  ≥ (0) or b = 1 if  ≤ (1)) small changes in the
model parameters will not aﬀect the amount of information production. For the
comparative statics presented in the following proposition we therefore focus on
the stable interior equilibrium b3 ∈ (max 1).
Proposition 3 Suppose parameters are such that the highest amount of informa-
tion production in equilibrium b ∈ (0 1). The amount of information production
b then increases in .
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The intuition for this result is as follows. As the risky project becomes more
profitable, for each level of information production, the firm chooses this project
more frequently. Then, informed speculators’ expected trading profits increase
because the value of the firm is more exposed to the information about the
profitability of the risky project. As a result, in equilibrium, more speculators
choose to pay the cost of information, and the equilibrium amount of information
increases.
4.2 Amplification
Utilizing the result above about the eﬀect of the relative profitability of the
risky project on information production, we now turn to analyze the eﬀect of
the ex-ante profitability of the risky project on the expected value of the firm.
Recall that changes in  could originate either from changes in the profitability
of the risky project  or from changes in the profitability of the risk free project
0. We focus here on changes in  , which are more in line with the examples
that motivate our analysis. Hence, we will refer to an increase in  (originating
from an increase in  ) as an increase in the fundamental of the firm. We ask
what is the eﬀect of improvement in the firm’s growth option (increase in the
firm’s fundamentals) on the firm’s value. Our main result is that endogenous
information production amplifies the impact that such improvement has on the
firm’s expected value.
Since this section is concerned with the comparative static with respect to ,
we include  as a function argument. Thus, let  (b; ) be the expected value of
the firm as a function of the equilibrium amount of information produced b and
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the risky action’s profitability . We showed above that the firm chooses the risky
action whenever noise trading is above a certain threshold. In the good state
( = ), this threshold is  (b; )−b (2− 1), while in the bad state ( = ), the
firm chooses the risky action whenever  is above  (b; ) + b (2− 1). Hence,
the expected value of the firm is
 (b; ) = 1
2
⎡
⎢⎣
∞Z
(;)−(2−1)
 ()+
(;)−(2−1)Z
−∞
 ()0
⎤
⎥⎦ (13)
+
1
2
⎡
⎢⎣
∞Z
(;)+(2−1)
 ()+
(;)+(2−1)Z
−∞
 ()0
⎤
⎥⎦ 
After performing changes of variables in both integrals and simplifying, this can
be written as:
 (b; ) = 0 (14)
+
1
2
( − )
∞Z
(;)
[ (− b (2− 1))− (1− ) (+ b (2− 1))] 
We can now calculate how firm value changes in response to a change in the
project’s fundamentals, measured by .10
 (b; )
 =

|{z}
 
+

b · b| {z }
 
 (15)
The first term in (15) captures the direct eﬀect that a change in the project’s
characteristic has on firm value. The second term captures the indirect eﬀect
through the information channel. As the following proposition shows, the infor-
mation channel amplifies the direct eﬀect of fundamentals () on firm value.
10Note that  and therefore  (; ) may be discontinuous in  so the following derivative is
only defined on the continuous and diﬀerentiable segments of  (; ). A discontinuity occurs
when 0 () = 0
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Proposition 4 Suppose that the highest equilibrium amount of information is
an interior solution b ∈ (0 1):
The endogenous response of information production to a change in the prof-
itability of the risky project amplifies its direct eﬀect on firm value:
 (b; )
 =

 +

b · b    0
Intuitively, the direct eﬀect,  , is positive given that an increase in ex-ante
profitability of the risky project directly increases the value of the firm. This
is amplified by the indirect eﬀect through the information channel, as  · 
is also positive. The mechanism behind the indirect eﬀect reflects two forces.
First, as we know from Proposition 3, the amount of information produced in
the market increases when ex-ante profitability of the risky project improves
(  0). Second, the presence of more information enables the firm to make a
more eﬃcient investment decision and this increases the value of the firm ( 
0).11
Given the stylized nature of our model, it is obviously diﬃcult to assess the
quantitative significance of the amplification eﬀect identified above. The next
proposition demonstrates an important feature of the amplification eﬀect, namely
that it can sometimes be unboundedly large. Hence, in these cases, it ought to
be quantitatively significant.
11We have analyzed a version of the model with three investment levels: Invest in the risky
project in large scale, small scale, or not at all. We show that the presence of a corresponding
option to expand (abandon) increases (decreases) equilibrium information production. Infor-
mation now aﬀects more decisions which strengthens the amplification eﬀect.
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Proposition 5 Suppose   12 and   max, so that there exists an interior
equilibrium b3 ∈ (max 1). Then there exists a ∗ such that the limit from above
lim→∗+

b · b =∞
Moreover,  (b; ) is discontinuous in  = ∗.
Intuitively, the information channel has the most drastic impact on firm value
near the point where a small reduction in the risky project’s fundamental  drives
out all informed trade. This happens near the point where the profit function
reaches its maximum (Figure 1). At this point, a small decrease in  causes
informed trading to drop sharply, and in ∗, discontinuously. Essentially, if the
profit from information production worsens to the point where   max no
longer holds, then a positive amount of information can no longer be sustained
in equilibrium and we drop to a unique equilibrium of b = 0. This is the source
of discontinuity in firm value with respect to project fundamentals.
The economic force behind this result is the presence of strategic complemen-
tarities in information production when the ex-ante relative profitability of the
risky project is negative. In this case, the firm only invests if there is enough
information in the price. Hence, a speculator finds it worthwhile to produce
information when suﬃciently many other speculators do so. A small decrease
in fundamentals can then lead informed speculation to dry up completely in a
market breakdown: traders stop producing information and abandon the market
due to the correct expectation that others will do so as well. Since the market in
our model has an important real eﬀect in guiding resource allocation, this has a
substantial negative eﬀect on the firm’s value.
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4.3 Application to business cycle fluctuations
Although the firm’s decision problem is very simple, it is suﬃciently general to
capture several possible applications. The firm has to take an action conditional
on information, as with a real option. It could be an option to enter a new
market or launch a new product if conditions are favorable. Similarly, a firm
could decide to abandon a market or product following negative information.
Under either scenario, one action, labelled  = 1 entails more risk than another,
labelled  = 0.
We now discuss one application which we believe to be particularly relevant,
namely where the risky action corresponds to a growth opportunity. 0 can then
be thought of as the expected firm value if the firm does not exercise the growth
option. That value would be given by the value of the firm’s cash holdings plus
the net present value of its ongoing operations. Note that 0 does not have to
be literally a risk free payoﬀ. All we need is that there is no private information
available about 0 so that speculators cannot profit when  = 0 is chosen. If
 = 0 represents the company’s status quo, it is quite plausible that there is
no (or little) private information left on which speculators may trade. We can
then think of  as a measure of the profitability of growth opportunities. The
parameter  might diﬀer across firms and over time.
We now develop the idea that  may vary over time and be interpreted as
a shock to firms production technology. A high  can be thought of as ‘good
times’ when firms have better new (and risky) investment opportunities. From
the amplification result of Proposition 5, it is clear that small changes to the
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production technology may lead to large changes in firm value.12
Embedding our model in a fully dynamic general equilibrium model is be-
yond the scope of this paper. It is nevertheless interesting to speculate about
the macroeconomic implications of our amplification mechanism. In order to do
so, we will now discuss which margins of a Real Business Cycle (RBC) model
our mechanism may aﬀect and whether those margins are thought to be useful
starting points as potential explanations of empirical patterns in business cycle
fluctuations. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007) show that frictions in existing
RBC models can be generally captured by four types of frictions in a prototype
model: the labor wedge, the investment wedge, the eﬃciency wedge and govern-
ment intervention. They argue that for RBC models to match observed output
fluctuations, they must feature a significant eﬃciency wedge (fluctuations in total
factor productivity, TFP) and/or a significant labor wedge. We will now discuss
how our model can be thought of in terms of these two wedges.13
12 In principle, one could think of a situation where a positive productivity shock increases the
value of the risk free project relative to the risky project. Good times would then be associated
with less information production and the information channel would work to attenuate the
direct positive impact of the productivity shock, rather than amplify it. We believe it is more
plausible to think of good times as being associated with more investment in new projects,
rather than their abandonment.
13There is a literature that links business cycle fluctuations to capital market imperfections,
for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), and Suarez and Sussman (1997). Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007) argue that
the corresponding financial frictions translate into investment wedges, which are empirically
less relevant. More recently, other papers link amplification and fluctuations to informational
channels, e.g., Veldkamp (2005), Angeletos and La’O (2013), and Kurlat (2013). Our setting
diﬀers by linking changes in the economic outlook to endogenous changes in jointly-determined
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4.3.1 TFP fluctuations
Suppose there is a measure one continuum of ex-ante identical firms, indexed by
 ∈ [0 1]  Each firm can choose between two projects — one is riskless and one
is a risky growth opportunity — as described before. Growth opportunities are
uncorrelated across firms, so that the success of each firm’s risky project now
depends on a firm-specific state of the world  ∈ { }. For simplicity, assume
that either project requires an identical amount of factor input  (which could be
capital or labor) which is the only factor of production. These assumptions imply
that all output fluctuations are due to productivity shocks and not changes in
levels of input. This simplification allows us to clearly identify the TFP channel.
Below we discuss what happens when input levels diﬀer between  = 0 and
 = 1.
Firm values were defined before as being net of the cost of taking an action 
We can then define output as  0 = 0+  if  = 0 is chosen and   = +  if
 = 1 is chosen. Total factor productivity of firm ,   can then be defined
as
 = 1 + 

 
where
  =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if  = 0
 if  = 1
We can then calculate how total factor productivity of this economy fluctuates
with a change in , keeping the parameters 0  and ∆ ≡  −  constant
(i.e., varying  only). This can be done by aggregating over all firms’ realized
information production and investment behavior.
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 , i.e.,  = R 10  Since there is a continuum of identical firms with
uncorrelated projects, the realized  is just equal to the ex-ante expected
 of an individual firm. Moreover, given that investment levels do not diﬀer
across actions, [ ] can be calculated directly using the expected firm value
 (b; ) from (14). From Proposition 4 it follows that a drop in the fundamental
 will lead to a direct reduction in measured  of the economy. Importantly,
this direct eﬀect is amplified through the information channel: A drop in 
reduces information production, which worsens resource allocation and thereby
productivity. As before, a small drop of  around ∗ leads to a discontinuous
drop in information production and therefore to a discontinuous drop in measured
 . Hence, small shocks to the production function (i.e., small shocks to )
can be amplified into large shocks in measured  .
Figure 2 provides a numerical example. In the example, the  of the
riskless project is normalized to 1, and  fluctuates between 0.491 and 0.505;
moving from  = 0505 to  = 0491 corresponds to a 2.9% drop in the NPV
of the risky project. The solid line plots  when information production
is endogenously given in equilibrium, while the dashed line gives  when
information is exogenously fixed at b ( = 0505). As can be seen from the figure,
the direct eﬀect of a change in the fundamental is much smaller than the indirect
eﬀect. In the numerical example, the direct eﬀect of a 2.9% drop in the NPV of
the growth opportunity, has a direct eﬀect of reducing  by 1.3%. Once the
indirect eﬀect is taken into account the drop in  amounts to 11.6%.
Importantly, the numerical example focuses on variations of  around ∗,
which is obviously where amplification is most important. It is, however, quite
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Figure 2: This Figure shows expected TFP as a function of . Parameter values
are  −  = 2 2 = 07  = 03  = 1. The TFP of the risk free investment
is normalized to 1. The solid line gives TFP when information production is
endogenously given in equilibrium. The dashed line gives TFP for  fixed at
that level which would obtain in equilibrium when  = 0505, which corresponds
to the highest  plotted in the figure.
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plausible to believe that this parameter range is particularly relevant in practice.
If one thinks of  as a property of the marginal investment project, it is quite
plausible that it should be near the point of a zero NPV (absent further informa-
tion). If the project were much more profitable ex-ante, it is likely that it would
have been invested in already.
In summary, our model produces large fluctuations in measured TFP due to
the endogenous changes in the eﬃciency of resource allocation, as it depends on
information production in financial markets. We thus provide a microfoundation
for why productivity shocks may be amplified. It would be interesting to embed
our mechanism into a full-blown RBC model and to explore further the extent
to which it can generate the kinds of eﬃciency wedges that Chari, Kehoe and
McGrattan (2007) argue can explain observed business cycle fluctuations.
4.3.2 Fluctuations in factor inputs
We now extend the previous example to allow for varying levels of factor input
(capital or labor), depending on whether project  = 0 or 1 is chosen. Denote by
 the factor input corresponding to the project chosen by firm . As before, we
interpret the project  = 1 as an investment in a growth opportunity. Assume
that 1  0, that is the factor input required for the growth opportunity is
greater than that for the riskless project. We think this is the reasonable case
to consider. Denote the aggregate factor input by  = R 10 . We can then
conduct a comparative static with respect to  keeping, as before, 0, 0 1, and
∆ constant. We can again distinguish between a direct and an indirect eﬀect:

 =

 +

b b 
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Proposition 6 Suppose that b ∈ (0 1). The direct eﬀect of an increase in the
profitability of the risky project  on aggregate factor input is positive, i.e.,

  0
The indirect eﬀect of an increase in  is positive if   12 and negative if   12 .
An increase in  directly increases aggregate factor input, because firms are
more willing to invest in the “high input” growth opportunity, i.e., the threshold
 (b; ) falls. The sign of the indirect eﬀect depends on the ex-ante profitability
of the growth opportunity. If it is negative (  12), a firm’s default action is
not to invest in the growth opportunity and it needs to learn suﬃciently positive
news in order to be willing to invest. An increase in the amount of equilibrium
information b, resulting from an increase in , increases the likelihood of learn-
ing suﬃciently positive news, increasing the aggregate input level further. The
information channel therefore amplifies the direct eﬀect of a change in .
Note that since ∗  12 , a small drop of  around ∗ leads to a discontinuous
drop in the aggregate input level. If information drops discontinuously to zero,
the aggregate level of investment drops discontinuously to 0: When all informa-
tion production is driven out, firms cannot learn from prices and never invest in
the growth opportunity since   12 . Our model thus predicts potentially large
fluctuations in factor demand as a response to small changes in the profitability
of investment opportunities. It would be interesting to embed the model in a
general equilibrium set-up so as to understand whether such demand fluctua-
tions can have a significant impact on the amount of equilibrium investment and
employment, which will presumably depend on the elasticity of factor supplies.
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We believe this is a promising line of future research.
If   12 the indirect eﬀect mitigates the direct eﬀect of a change in  on
factor inputs. To see why, remember that at   12 , a firm invests in the growth
opportunity in the absence of information. More information therefore allows
firms more often to avoid investing in the growth opportunity in the bad state of
the world. More information therefore leads to a reduction in factor input.
5 Discussion
5.1 Welfare
We now investigate how the equilibrium amount of information production com-
pares to the social optimum. Suppose the social planner cannot aﬀect the way
in which information gets communicated and therefore must rely on the price
mechanism. He can, however, choose the mass of traders who pay the informa-
tion production cost, e.g., by taxing / subsidizing trading activity.
A simple objective function for a social planner would be expected firm value
net of the information production cost incurred by traders. Since trading profits
are redistributive we ignore them in the social planner’s problem. For a formal
treatment and a more detailed derivation of the welfare function, see an online
Appendix.14
It is then possible to show that information is socially most valuable for  = 12 .
This makes intuitive sense, since that is the point where the prior belief provides
14The Appendix also explores the policy option of taxing / subsidizing a firm’s investment
activity. This policy tool is relevant if direct trading subsidies lead to distortions in the form of
spurious trading activity.
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the weakest guidance as to what is the optimal decision. As  moves away
from 12 (in either direction) the value of information drops monotonically and
symmetrically. Again this is intuitive: as  gets closer to 0 or 1, the prior provides
a stronger indication of the optimal action and hence additional information is
less valuable. Correspondingly, the socially optimal mass of informed traders is
hump shaped, reaching a maximum at  = 12  and with bounds 0  12 such that
the socially optimal amount of information production is zero for   0 and
  1− 0.
Compare this to the equilibrium amount of information production and focus
on the non-trivial case where  is small enough such that a positive amount of in-
formation is produced for some values of . From the previous discussion we know
that there exists a ∗, such that for   ∗ equilibrium information production
is zero, while it is positive and increasing for  ≥ ∗. It is then straightforward
to show that for relatively small values of  we may get insuﬃcient information
production in equilibrium, while the opposite is true when  is relatively large.
To see this, suppose 0  ∗  1 − 0. When  ∈ (0 ∗) the equilibrium
amount of information production is zero, but the socially optimal amount is
strictly positive. Conversely, when   1 − 0, the socially optimal amount of
information production is zero, while the equilibrium amount is strictly positive.
These results can be linked to Hirshleifer’s (1971) distinction between two
types of information: discovery and foreknowledge. Discovery means learning
information that will not necessarily be revealed otherwise, such as inventing a
new technology. Foreknowledge means learning information that will in any case
be revealed later on, such as learning a firm’s earnings a few days in advance.
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Only the first type of information is socially valuable, but private rewards may
provide diﬀerent incentives.
In our model, foreknowledge can be thought of as information about a project’s
cash flows when there is no or little uncertainty about whether the project will
be undertaken (corresponding to a high ). Discovery can be thought of as infor-
mation needed to guide the decision on whether to take the risky project or not:
if the project is not taken, information about  will not become available. Our
model shows that incentives provided by financial markets to generate discovery
type information are systematically weaker than incentives to produce ‘foreknowl-
edge’ (i.e., b increases in ). The higher , the bigger the wedge between the
social and the private value of information.15
5.2 Relation to literature
5.2.1 The real eﬀects of financial markets
Our model contributes to a literature analyzing the role of market information in
firms’ decisions. Financial markets play a vital role in the economy even when no
capital issuance is directly involved — i.e., in secondary financial markets. Mar-
ket prices provide signals to decision makers and indirectly guide investment and
other decisions in the real economy. This is valuable because markets gather
information from many diﬀerent participants, who are too numerous to commu-
15There is a vast recent literature highlighting diﬀerent considerations in what makes infor-
mation socially desirable or not. See, for example, Morris and Shin (2002), Angeletos and Pavan
(2007), and Amador and Weill (2010).
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nicate with the firm outside the trading process.16 Due to high costs, incentive
problems, and issues of conformity and corporate culture, the firm will arguably
have diﬃculty in replicating this kind of information production internally. For
example, Dow and Gorton (1997) argued that internal information production
introduces agency problems in motivating information producers, while finan-
cial market traders can profit directly from their informed trades.17 Our paper
contributes to the theoretical literature by analyzing the incentives to produce
information in a model where market prices have a feedback eﬀect on firms’
investments and cash flows.18
16For example, the literature on prediction markets shows that markets provide better fore-
casts than polls and other devices (see Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004)).
17Traditional analysis of secondary financial markets with asymmetric information — e.g.,
Grossman (1976), Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Hellwig (1980), Kyle (1985), Glosten and
Milgrom (1985) — limits attention to assets whose cash flows are exogenous. There is, however,
a literature that allows for the presence of feedback from prices to firm cash flows, among
others, Fishman and Hagerty (1992), Leland (1992), Dow and Gorton (1997), Subrahmanyam
and Titman (1999), Dow and Rahi (2003), Foucault and Gehrig (2008), Goldstein and Guembel
(2008), Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010), and Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (2014).
Empirical evidence in support of the allocational role of secondary market prices has been
found by Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), Luo (2005), and Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007).
A survey of the empirical and theoretical literature has been provided by Bond, Edmans, and
Goldstein (2012).
18The few papers that allow for endogenous information production in this literature have a
diﬀerent focus from our work. Khanna, Slezak and Bradley (1994) explore the costs and benefits
of insider trading by managers. Boot and Thakor (1997) and Dow and Gorton (1997)) compare
bank and market financing. Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) and Hennessy (2009) study firms’
choice between debt and equity. Strobl (2014) looks into the resolution of a managerial agency
problem, while Huang, Kang and Gorton (2013) consider the interaction between corporate
governance and CEO turnover. Finally, Peress (2014) incorporates the feedback eﬀect in an
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5.2.2 Strategic complementarities in information production
Our model generates strategic complementarities in information production when
  12 . These strategic complementarities are an important feature of our pa-
per and lead to the extreme amplification of shocks to fundamentals. There is
a recent literature developing diﬀerent mechanisms that generate strategic com-
plementarities in information acquisition, for example, Froot, Scharfstein and
Stein (1992), Veldkamp (2006), Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009), Garcia and Strobl
(2011), Ganguli and Yang (2009) and Goldstein and Yang (2015).
Our model identifies a novel mechanism generating such strategic complemen-
tarities, namely the feedback from the financial market to real investments.19
There are two distinguishing features in our model relative to other papers of
complementarities in information acquisition in financial markets. First, the in-
volvement of the real sector in our model implies that complementarities have
an eﬀect on firm value and investment, and not just on prices like in other pa-
pers. Second, complementarities arise in our framework only when fundamentals
are low — in particular, when the NPV of the investment is ex-ante negative —
and so the extreme amplification arises only then. Hence, in contrast to the
above papers, our theory predicts that amplification is more likely to arise when
endogenous growth model so as to explore the eﬀect of wealth accumulation on information
production. In contrast, our paper aims to investigate how information production leads to
amplification of small changes in fundamentals into large (sometimes discontinuous) changes in
investments and firm values. This result is new in the feedback literature.
19Angeletos, Lorenzoni, and Pavan (2012) and Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan (2011) gen-
erate strategic complementarities in trading due to a feedback eﬀect, but do not consider infor-
mation production.
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fundamentals are relatively weak.
5.2.3 Uncertainty shocks
Exogenous uncertainty shocks
Bloom (2009) shows that (exogenous) uncertainty shocks can lead to signifi-
cant output drops and argues that these are due to firms postponing investment
decisions in response to higher uncertainty (see also Fernandez-Villaverde et al.
(2011)). In terms of our model, an exogenous increase in uncertainty can be
thought of as an increase in ∆ =  − .
Our model delivers results similar to Bloom’s findings when   12 . Here, if
there is very little uncertainty, the firm always invests. As uncertainty increases,
it becomes more costly for the firm to invest (mistakenly) when the state of the
world is bad. It thus requires more strongly positive information in order to
invest. More uncertainty therefore decreases investment, as in Bloom (2009). On
the other hand, when   12 , and there is little uncertainty, the investment is only
worth making when there is strongly positive news. As uncertainty increases, it
becomes more costly for the firm to fail to invest (mistakenly) when the state of
the world is good. Higher uncertainty therefore lowers the investment threshold
and increases investment frequency.
Another channel by which uncertainty may aﬀect  is if agents in the model
are risk averse and therefore discount risky cash flows more heavily. In that case
an increase in uncertainty can be thought of as directly reducing  (in present
value terms) and thereby . In that sense, an increase in uncertainty directly
leads to a reduction in the equilibrium amount of information production.
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Endogenous uncertainty shocks
An obvious question is whether changes in  (driven by changes in  ) have
an impact on endogenous measures of uncertainty. Since our model’s focus is
on information production, it seems most relevant to focus on the dispersion of
beliefs about the underlying state of the world of the privately informed agents
in the economy (all the others have homogenous beliefs). We can measure belief
dispersion by the distance in beliefs of two agents who receive diﬀerent private
signals and then update based on publicly available information (order flow and
price). We show that belief dispersion is decreasing in  (for a formal treatment
see the online appendix).
The intuition for this result is straightforward by now. A drop in  reduces
the equilibrium amount of information production b. The stock price therefore
conveys less information and agents know less about which state of the world
pertains. Agents with private information therefore disagree more strongly. This
result is in line with Bachmann, Elster and Sims (2013) who study disagree-
ment among managers on the economic outlook based on surveys of managers
in Germany and the US. Bachmann et al. view disagreement as a measure of
uncertainty and show that it increases during economic downturns.
5.3 Empirical predictions
A central prediction of our paper is that information production in financial mar-
kets and hence price informativeness will increase when firms have better invest-
ment opportunities (Proposition 3). Testing this prediction requires a measure
of investment opportunities and a measure of price informativeness.
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There are various proxies for investment opportunities. Over time, we expect
investment opportunities to be stronger in booms than in busts. In the cross
section, innovative firms at the frontier of technology or firms with a high market-
to-book ratio (growth firms) are likely to have better investment opportunities.
A prominent measure of price informativeness in the literature is price non-
synchronicity (Roll, 1988), reflecting the extent to which a stock price moves
independently of the market (see the survey by Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2013)).
Another measure in the literature is the probability of informed trading measure
(PIN) based on the structural model of Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1996).
One could investigate other indicators of information production in the fi-
nancial sector, such as analyst activity. Anecdotal evidence indeed suggests that
financial firms’ employment policies are more pro-cyclical than employment poli-
cies of other firms. In the cross section, McNichols and O’Brien (1997), Sun
(2003), and Das, Guoh and Zhang (2006) document that analysts tend to follow
firms with better prospects.
One possibility for empirical testing is to explore price informativeness (us-
ing the above measures) around the time of major corporate decisions. Mergers
and acquisitions are a leading example, representing major investment opportu-
nities for speculators to produce information. Our model predicts that they will
produce more information when the acquisition is more likely to be completed.
Completion is more likely when the initial stock price reaction of the acquirer
is more positive, indicating a high expected NPV of the acquisition. Hence,
our model predicts that price informativeness of the acquirer’s stock after the
announcement of the acquisition, will be higher if the market reaction to the an-
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nouncement is more positive. Some acquisitions have large break-up fees, making
them unlikely to be cancelled (see Luo, 2005), so we also predict greater price
informativeness if there is a larger break-up fee.
Another set of predictions of our model is related to the amplification results
in Proposition 4 and Proposition 5. First, the information channel amplifies the
eﬀect of shocks to investment opportunities on firm value and TFP20. Second,
this eﬀect may be very large when investment opportunities are expected to be
less profitable.
One way to test the first prediction is to compare diﬀerent types of firms
over the business cycle. We predict that TFP and investment behaviour fluctua-
tions should be stronger for growth firms, because they are more sensitive to our
amplification mechanism. According to our model, Growth firms rely more on
market information, and should tend to exhibit stronger sensitivity of investment
to price. Also, our amplification mechanism is specific to traded securities; it is
not relevant to private firms. Hence, we expect TFP to exhibit stronger business
cycle fluctuations for public firms than for similar private firms.
Concerning the second prediction, our model suggests that TFP and invest-
ments will be more volatile in busts than in booms, and this will coincide with
diﬀerences in the volatility of price informativeness.
Finally, our analysis has potential implications for asset pricing variables such
as price volatility, trading volume, and perhaps risk premia, although one would
need to embed our mechanism in a fully-fledged dynamic asset pricing model to
20This eﬀect may also contribute to the fact documented by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) that
there is much less capital re-allocation among firms during recessions than in booms.
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spell them out. Based on the model presented here, informed trading increases
in good times for growth firms, and this should make their trading volume more
procyclical. Also, informed trading is more volatile for growth firms in bad times,
and this should lead to an increase in their price volatility at those times. While
information should also have first-order implications for risk premia and their
behavior over the cycle, since our model does not feature risk aversion, we do not
speculate here on the exact predictions and leave it for future research.
6 Conclusion
Financial markets play a central role in the economy. Most financial markets
are secondary markets, which have no direct eﬀect on capital investment, but
whose market prices aggregate information that aﬀects real investment decisions
and consequently firm value. The model developed in this paper helps under-
stand some consequences of this feedback eﬀect by endogenizing the amount of
information produced by market traders.
We show that speculators have stronger incentives to produce information
about an investment opportunity when the firm is more likely to undertake the
investment. This creates an amplification eﬀect whereby small changes in fun-
damentals are amplified into large changes in real investments and firm values.
Importantly, our model generates a market breakdown, where a small change in
fundamentals can lead information production to dry up completely, generating
a collapse in investment and firm value.
Amplification of small changes in fundamentals is a central topic in economics.
Our paper is the first one that links amplification to the informational role of
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financial markets. Information in financial markets gets produced by specula-
tors who are motivated by trading profits. This leads them to produce more
information in good times than in bad times (or more information about good
firms than about bad firms), generating our amplification mechanism. Given
that information asymmetries are among the most important frictions driving
investment and financing behavior, we believe that our informational channel is
an important addition to the understanding of amplification in investment and
firm values. We discuss some related empirical evidence and new empirical pre-
dictions and propose a new avenue for exploration in the dynamic real business
cycle literature.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: We first verify that the decision rule in (7) is optimal
for the firm. This holds because observing a price above 0 reveals that the
updated belief about  =  is suﬃciently positive such that taking the risky
project  = 1 is optimal. A price of 0 reveals the opposite. Second, the pricing
rule in (6) reflects the expected value of the firm given the order flow, and given
the firm’s investment decision: the price is equal to 0 when the risky project
is not expected to be taken and is equal to expected firm value when the risky
project is taken. QED.
Proof of Lemma 2: Consider a speculator who receives  =  and buys.
With probability  the state is  =  and the speculator earns  −  () if
   () and zero if  ≤  () With probability 1− the state is  =  and
the speculator earns  −  () if    () and zero if  ≤  (). Moreover,
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since in state  =  we have  =  +  (2− 1) and in state  =  we have
 = −  (2− 1) we get
 [| = ] = 
Z ∞
()−(2−1)
( −  (+  (2− 1))) () 
+(1− )
Z ∞
()+(2−1)
( −  (−  (2− 1))) () 
Using the price function (6) and (2), we can rewrite the expected profit of a
speculator after observing a positive signal as:
 [| = ]
=  ( − )
Z ∞
()−(2−1)
 (+ 2 (2− 1))
 () +  (+ 2 (2− 1)) () 
− (1− ) ( − )
Z ∞
()+(2−1)
 (− 2 (2− 1))
 () +  (− 2 (2− 1)) ()  (16)
Conducting the change of variable  =  +  (2− 1) to the first line and  =
−  (2− 1) to the second line yields
 [| = ]
=  ( − )
∞Z
()
 (+  (2− 1))
 (−  (2− 1)) +  (+  (2− 1)) (−  (2− 1)) 
− (1− ) ( − )
∞Z
()
 (+  (2− 1))
 (−  (2− 1)) +  (+  (2− 1)) (−  (2− 1)) 
This can be rewritten as
 [| = ] = (2− 1) ( − )
Z ∞
()
 (;) 
Going through the same line of reasoning for selling upon receiving  =  yields
an identical expression for  [| = ].
Finally, note that  [| = ]  0. Therefore, if the speculator were to sell
on  = , he would make a trading loss − [| = ] (and symmetrically for
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buying on  = ). It follows that the speculator’s trading strategy is optimal.
QED.
Proof of Proposition 1: We first show that when   12 , () is a strictly
decreasing function. We can write
 ()
 =


Ã
(2− 1) ( − )
Z ∞
()
(;)
!
= (2− 1) ( − )
"Z ∞
()
(;)
 −
 ()
 ( () ;)
#
 (17)
First we show that (;) ≤ 0. Using the definition of (;) as given in (9)
and the fact that 0 () = − 2 () we can write
(;)

= (2− 1)(;)
³−(2−1)
2  (+  (2− 1))− +(2−1)2  (−  (2− 1))
´
 (−  (2− 1)) +  (+  (2− 1)) 
We thus need to show that
(−  (2− 1)) (+  (2− 1))− (+  (2− 1)) (−  (2− 1)) ≤ 0
i.e.
 [ (+  (2− 1))−  (−  (2− 1))] (18)
≤  (2− 1) [ (+  (2− 1)) +  (−  (2− 1))] 
If   0, then, because  is the density function of a normal distribution with
mean 0,  (+  (2− 1)) ≥  (−  (2− 1)), and thus the LHS of (18) is
negative while the RHS is positive, so the inequality in (18) holds. Similarly, if
  0, then  (+  (2− 1)) ≤  (−  (2− 1)), and again the LHS of (18)
is negative while the RHS is positive, so the inequality in (18) holds.
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From (4) we can see that when   12 , we will have ln 1−  0, and so
()
  0. Thus, the second term in (17) is negative. It follows that ()  0.
Thus, since () is strictly decreasing the equilibrium is unique. There is a
corner solution b = 0 if  (0) ≤  or b = 1 if  (1) ≥ . The threshold on 
follows from calculating  (0) = (2− 1) −2 . Otherwise, if  (0)     (1),
there exists a unique interior intersection point  () = . QED.
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) We need to show that if b = 0, the profit from
producing information is 0. From (4), we can see that, for   12 , lim→0 () =
∞. Substituting this in the profit function (8), and noting that lim→0(;) =
1
2 (), we know that lim→0  () = 0.
(ii) This follows directly from the previous part and from the fact that  
max.
(iii) From (8) it is clear that  ()  0 for all   0.
Next, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3 lim→∞  () = 0
Proof: Since as →∞, ¯()→ 0, for suﬃcient large , we will have
()  (2− 1) ( −)
Z ∞
−1
(−  (2− 1))(+  (2− 1))
(−  (2− 1)) + (+  (2− 1))
Note that (−)(+)(−)+(+)  (+ ), so
()  (2− 1) ( −)
Z ∞
−1
(+  (2− 1))
= (2− 1) ( −)
∙Z 1
−1
(+  (2− 1))+
Z ∞
1
(+  (2− 1))
¸

Since lim→∞ ( +  (2− 1)) = 0, lim→∞ R 1−1 ( +  (2− 1)) = 0. ForR∞
1 ( +  (2− 1)), note that when  ≥ 1 and  ≥ 0, ( +  (2− 1)) =
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1√
2−
1
22 (+(2−1))2  1√
2−
1
22 (+(2−1)), we have
Z ∞
1
(+  (2− 1))

Z ∞
1
1√
2
− 1
22 (+(2−1)) = 1√
22
2− 122 (1+(2−1)) → 0 as →∞
so lim→∞
R∞
1 (+  (2− 1)) = 0. Thus lim→∞ () = 0. QED
From the three properties (a)  (0) = 0(b) lim→∞  () = 0 and (c)  () 
0 for all   0 it follows that  () achieves its global maximum for some finite
and positive value of . The rest of the characterization follows directly. Finally,
to be sure that an interior solution b3 exists for some parameters, it suﬃces to
provide an example, which is done in Figure 1. QED
Proof of Proposition 3: We start by analyzing the eﬀect of  on trading
profits  () for any level of information production .
 ()
 = (2− 1) ( − )
"Z ∞
()
(;)
 −
 ()
 ·( () ;)
#
(19)
Since (;) does not depend on  (see the definition of 9), we have (;) = 0.
Moreover, for any finite  () we have (;)  0. From (4), it follows that
()
  0. Hence, ()  0.
By the implicit function theorem we have  = −
³()

´

³()

´
. Since
b3 is on the downward sloping segment of the profit function, it follows that
3  0. QED
Proof of Proposition 4: We know from the proof of Proposition 3 that
  0. Hence, to prove the proposition, we need to show that   0 and

  0.
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Based on the expression for  (b; ) in (14), we know that:
 (b; )

=
1
2
( − )
Z ∞
(;)
[ (− b (2− 1)) +  (+ b (2− 1))] 
− 1
2
( − )  (b; ) £ ¡ (b; )− b (2− 1)¢− (1− ) ¡ (b; ) + b (2− 1)¢¤ 
Using (2) and (3), we can see that the expression in the brackets in the second
line is 0. Since the expression in the first line is positive, we know that   0.
Now we can write:
 (b; )
b
=
1
2
( − )
Z ∞
(;)
£−0 (− b (2− 1))− (1− )0 (+ b (2− 1))¤ 
− 1
2
( − )  (b; )b £ ¡ (b; )− b (2− 1)¢− (1− ) ¡ (b; ) + b (2− 1)¢¤ 
The second line is again 0. The first line can be rewritten as:
1
2
( − ) £ ¡ (b; )− b (2− 1)¢+ (1− ) ¡ (b; ) + b (2− 1)¢¤ 
(20)
which is positive. Hence,   0. QED.
Proof of Proposition 5: First, the existence of a   12 yielding an interior
b follows directly from the fact that  (; ) is increasing in . Hence, it suﬃces
to choose a  such that   max= 1
2
, but    ( = 1; ) 
We know from (20) that

b
¯¯¯¯
0
 0
Hence, we need to show that  approaches ∞ as  approaches ∗ from above.
Define ∗ by that value of  for which  (max) =  and therefore b = max By
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the implicit function theorem,
b
 = −
µ (b)

¶

µ (b)
b
¶

From the proof of Proposition 3, ()  0. Since  (b) is diﬀerentiable, it follows
that
 ()

¯¯¯¯
=max
= 0
and therefore 
¯¯¯
=∗ =∞
 (b; ) is continuous in b and . The discontinuity of  (b; ) in ∗ follows
directly from the discontinuity of b in ∗. The latter follows from the fact that
 () achieves its global maximum at the equilibrium point b  0 when  = ∗.
QED
Proof of Proposition 6: First we calculate
 = 0 + 1
2
+
1 − 0
2
£
1−  ¡ (; )−  (2− 1)¢−  ¡ (; ) +  (2− 1)¢¤ 
The direct eﬀect can be calculated as

 = −
 (; )

1 − 0
2
£ ¡ (; )− ¢+  ¡ (; ) + ¢¤ 
Since (;)  0 it follows that the direct eﬀect is positive.
Next we calculate

b = 1 − 02
½ (b; )b £ ¡ (b; )− b¢+  ¡ (b; ) + b¢¤
+(2− 1) £ ¡ (b; )− b¢−  ¡ (b; ) + b¢¤ª 
This expression is positive if and only if  (b; )  0 which is the case if and
only if   12 . QED
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